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Abstract 
There is a large body of research showing that the provision of social policies is 
higher under proportional electoral systems than under majoritarian rules. This paper 
helps to advance this literature by showing that the geographic distribution of social 
recipients plays an essential role in moderating the impact of electoral institutions on 
social provision. Using data on social spending in 22 OECD countries for the period 
1980- 2010, results show that majoritarian systems increase the provision of the 
related social policy when recipients are concentrated in certain regions. When levels 
of concentration are high, social spending in majoritarian countries can surpass levels 
of provision in proportional representation systems. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature in political economy has shown that electoral rules are essential to 
explain the composition and levels of public spending across countries. In particular, 
many authors have argued that the provision of social policies will be higher in 
proportional electoral systems compared to majoritarian ones. However, a key 
assumption in most important theoretical works is that the population is homogeneous 
or it is perfectly segregated across districts.1 Yet public policies have beneficiaries 
that are not necessarily homogeneously spread across territories, and this means that 
the theoretical relationship between electoral rules and public spending might not 
generally hold. Our paper contributes to developing these caveats by studying 
whether the effect of electoral rules upon governments’ provision of public spending 
is contingent upon the geography of social recipients. More specifically, we 
hypothesise that the incentives to provide social spending in majoritarian systems will 
increase when social recipients are geographically concentrated. We test this 
argument with data on social spending in 22 OECD countries for the period 1980-
2010 and find supportive evidence. The empirical evidence suggests that geographic 
clustering can bring social spending in majoritarian systems to levels equal to those in 
PR. 
This paper speaks to recent developments in political economy that explore the role of 
economic and political geography in redistribution, representation and policy 
provision.2 More specifically, our theoretical argument is in line with several studies 
that focus on the joint role of geography and electoral institutions in the provision of 
																																								 																				
1 Iversen and Soskice 2006; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Persson, Tabellini and Brocas 2000; Persson and 
Tabellini 2003. 
2 Rodden 2010; Beramendi 2012; Rickard 2008; Rickard 2012. 
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certain policies, such as trade3, antipoverty policies4 or labour policies5. These works 
provide evidence that the effect of electoral rules upon the distribution of targeted 
public spending cannot be understood without considering the geographical 
concentration of recipients, being industries or individuals. In this paper we contribute 
to this literature by arguing that this framework of analysis can also be applied to 
universal policies, such as social spending. When beneficiaries of these policies are 
geographically defined, politicians may have incentives to use welfare spending to 
target specific districts. Hence, we expect electoral officials under majoritarian 
electoral rules to increase the provision of social policies when social recipients are 
geographically clustered.  
The paper extends existing literature in several ways. First, the empirical stakes in our 
analysis are more challenging than those in previous works, as we apply general 
predictions about the impact of geography in a worse case policy type, namely 
policies where room for territorial targeting is most limited due to their universalistic 
nature. Second, our theoretical model does not take to task the basic structure of 
incentives of politicians under majoritarian rules (that elected officials in single-
member districts will attempt to win seats by catering to local interests), but uses the 
same logic to predict that seemingly “universalistic” policies may also be strategically 
used to compete for votes in low-magnitude districts. By doing that, the paper 
																																								 																				
3 McGillivray 2004; Rickard 2012. Rickard (2012) shows that governments in majoritarian electoral 
systems increase subsidies when manufacturing industries are geographically concentrated; and that 
elected officials under proportional rules follow the same regulation strategies when industries are 
dispersed. See also Hansen  (1990) and Milner (1997) who show that in the United States concentrated 
industries are more protected by legislation. 
4 Jusko 2015; Jusko 2011; Jusko 2006. 
5 Menendez Gonzalez 2015.  
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provides new theoretical insights in explaining variation among majoritarian systems 
rather than simply focusing on the variation between electoral system types. Finally, 
by analysing how the geography of social recipients moderates the impact of electoral 
rules on public spending, our paper contributes to provide a more nuanced account of 
the conditional effect of electoral institutions. By doing that, it also advances the 
debate on whether institutions make a difference to political processes and outcomes, 
in general, and public spending, in particular.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the arguments on electoral 
systems and social spending and presents the main hypothesis of this paper. Section 
three introduces the variables, data and methods, while section four presents the 
results and section five the robustness checks. Finally, section six concludes. 
 
2. Social Policies, Electoral Systems, and Geographic Concentration  
Why levels of provision of social policies vary across countries? This has been a 
highly discussed and analysed question in political science during the last decades. 
The long-standing literature in the area spans from the classical works on welfare 
policies that rely on nation-wide cleavages to explain levels of redistribution6, to an 
extensive body of work that explores alternative explanations such as the corporatist 
structure of the state7, the openness of national economies8, the strength of the labour 
																																								 																				
6 Lipset and Rokkan 1967. 
7 Schmitter 1974; Grant 1985. 
8 Katzenstein 1985. 
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movement and left parties9, or the distribution of general and specific skills in the 
population.10  
A number of studies in the last fifteen years have instead focused on the role of the 
electoral system in explaining country-level variation in the composition and levels of 
social provision and redistribution. A prominent work in the area is that of Iversen 
and Soskice (2006), who argue that the provision of social policies is higher under 
proportional electoral systems than under majoritarian rules because left governments 
are more likely to be formed under PR rules.  
A stream of this research that has flourished in the last years comes up with a similar 
conclusion -proportional systems redistributing more than majoritarian ones- but 
focusing on the degree of targetability of public goods vs pork-barrel spending and 
the geographic incentives provided by each type of electoral system.11 The argument 
is that policymakers in majoritarian electoral systems -where there are many low-
magnitude districts- have incentives to implement narrow distributive policies to 
target specific groups of voters that are geographically concentrated instead of 
providing broad social policies that are national in scope. In contrast, in proportional 
systems politicians try to maximise their chances of winning nation-wide electoral 
support by using social and welfare policies that advance the interests of voters that 
spread across many districts or the whole nation.  
																																								 																				
9 Korpi 1978; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990. 
10 Hall and Soskice 2001. 
11 Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson, Tabellini and Brocas 2000; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Milesi-
Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno 2002; Grossman and Helpman 2005; Chang, Kayser and Rogowski 2008; 
Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni 2011; Breunig and Busemeyer 2012. 
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Yet empirical evidence on the relationship between electoral rules and the size and 
composition of public spending is not conclusive.12 This might be explained, at least 
partially, because this literature has largely overlooked the role of the geographical 
distribution of beneficiaries of public spending. The absence of geography is not 
unique to the study of the effects of electoral rules but has characterised some of the 
most important theoretical contributions in political science, such as the spatial theory 
of elections 13 , the median-voter model on redistribution 14  and the subsequent 
theoretical works they inspired. As Rodden puts it, geography has generally been “a 
blind spot for political scientists” (2010:322). However, recent contributions in 
political economy have begun to develop some interesting insights into the role of 
political and economic geography in explaining the level and composition of public 
spending15.  Some research has argued that the provision of narrow policies, such as 
trade16, antipoverty policies17 or labour policies18 is explained by the interaction of 
electoral institutions and geography. We contribute to advance this literature by 
arguing that the concentration of beneficiaries provides also greater scope to target 
public goods geographically. Certainly, when recipients of policies are unevenly 
distributed across jurisdictions, seemingly “universalistic” programmes of public 
spending may de facto turn into regionally distributive spending in the sense that 
beneficiaries are geographically defined. This means that although spending may 
																																								 																				
12 Franzese and Nooruddin 2004; Rickard 2008; Rickard 2012. 
13 Downs 1957. 
14 Meltzer and Richard 1981. 
15 Beramendi 2012, Jurado 2014.	
16 McGillivray 2004; Rickard 2012. 
17 Jusko 2015; Jusko 2011; Jusko 2006. 
18 Menendez Gonzalez 2015. 
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formally continue to be non-excludable public goods, some geographical areas with 
low concentration of recipients may in practice be excluded from the lion’s share of 
spending, while the benefits concentrate in others.  
 
3. The argument 
Our basic theoretical argument is that in a majoritarian electoral system, politicians 
will have more incentives to be responsive to social recipients when they are 
concentrated in certain districts. As a result, levels of social expenditure will be higher 
in majoritarian systems where social recipients are geographically concentrated than 
in a similar electoral system where they are evenly distributed across a large number 
of districts. This hypothesis is grounded on both demand-side and supply-side 
mechanisms. In essence, we contend that the geographic concentration of recipients in 
majoritarian systems: a) enhances the electoral reward of responding to the interests 
of social beneficiaries (demand-side explanation); and b) facilitates coordination of 
legislators’ electoral strategies and, in turn, the bargaining power of a pro-social 
legislative coalition (supply-side explanation). 
The concentration of individuals with similar (social spending) demands in small 
districts increases the likelihood that this group of voters becomes pivotal for any 
politician trying to win the district seat(s). Assuming that political elites are 
electorally motivated, i.e. that will decide upon the level and composition of social 
spending that best serves their electoral interests, legislators will have more incentives 
to cater to the interests of social recipients when they represent a relatively high 
	 9	
percentage of the population in some defined districts19. In addition, as Jusko (2006) 
has previously noted regarding antipoverty policies, social spending that is based on 
income support (which represents two thirds of social spending)20 is particularly well 
suited for electoral use because transfers in cash, such as unemployment benefits or 
pensions, are highly visible and perceived by the beneficiaries. These voters will tend 
to vote for politicians that, if elected, will increase their expected income. More 
importantly, we expect this electoral behaviour to be more similar among social 
recipients than among other sectors of the electorate. As social demand is correlated 
with low-income, social recipients are more likely than other voters to be responsive 
to in-cash benefits21. This means that each unit of social spending yields higher 
electoral elasticity: the marginal increase in support for politicians that implement an 
increase in spending is higher among the group of social recipients than among other 
electorates.22 In summary, concentration of recipients makes transfer programs more 
attractive for political elites in majoritarian electoral systems because: a) social 
recipients are more likely to become a pivotal group of voters to win legislative seat(s) 
in low-magnitude districts; and b) they are more likely to be electorally responsive to 
an increase in their expected income. In consequence, we expect higher levels of 
social provision in majoritarian systems where recipients are concentrated than where 
recipients are geographically dispersed.    
																																								 																				
19 Jusko (2015) shows in a theoretical model that in SMD electoral systems redistribution will be 
higher when low-income groups are concentrated (in rural or urban areas) than when they are 
geographically dispersed. 
20 See the OECD Social Expenditure Database: http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm 
21 Dixit and Londregan 1996. 
22 Jurado 2012. 
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As far as the supply-side mechanism is concerned, we argue that the concentration of 
recipients makes electoral strategies converge among legislators, which facilitates 
coordination and, in turn, strengthens the bargaining power of the pro-social coalition. 
In majoritarian systems districts are smaller and more numerous, so the territorial 
concentration of recipients is more likely to affect a number of electoral districts than 
in systems where districts are bigger. As the number of constituencies in which 
recipients are overrepresented increases, so it does the amount of legislators for which 
increasing social spending becomes the winning electoral strategy. Convergence of 
electoral interests among legislators facilitates the coordination of electoral strategies 
and, in turn, increases their leverage to press for a modification in the provision of 
social policies. Note that unlike pork-barrel spending, where provision is more likely 
driven by bilateral agreements between legislators, a change in levels of social 
provision can be more easily induced by a coordination strategy among legislators 
representing districts where social policy beneficiaries are concentrated.  
A final caveat is that, as long as the demand for social spending can correlate with 
low income, a potential source of criticism to our argument is that higher levels of 
social spending may be opposed (and in turn prevented) by a coalition of legislators 
from richer regions (unwilling to raise taxes to pay for higher redistribution). 
However, the distributive tensions that result from regional inequalities have been 
sorted out in different ways in different countries, and clearly not always in the 
direction of richer regions demanding less redistribution. On the one hand, political 
parties play an essential role in mediating distributive disagreements among regions. 
Where political parties are integrated, strong national party leaders can more easily 
discipline regional copartisans to make them comply with the national party’s 
	 11	
guidelines.23 Put it differently, national party leaders have strategies available24 with 
which to extract compliance from legislators and appease within-party conflict over 
regional redistribution.25 On the other hand, even where political decentralization 
provides political leaders with institutional leverage (and resources) to express their 
preferences, there are prominent examples among federal countries – such as Canada, 
Germany or Spain - in which rich regions have accepted high levels of 
redistribution.26 As Beramendi shows for the Canadian case (2012: 103 and ff.), risk 
sharing between regions is one of the key factors in shaping preferences for 
redistribution and, if there is high mobility of social recipients, wealthy regions may 
be more willing to accept public insurance programs to prevent cross-regional 
externalities.  
Table 1 summarises the interaction between electoral institutions and the geography 
of recipients in explaining the provision of social policies. Columns represent 
divisions across electoral institutions whereas rows capture variation in the 
distribution of recipients. Our main hypothesis (H1) states that when recipients of 
social policies are concentrated geographically, politicians in majoritarian systems 
will have more incentives to provide social policies than in contexts where recipients 
are more evenly distributed (D>B). On the contrary, we expect the standard 
prediction in the literature to hold (A>B) for low levels of concentration. 
																																								 																				
23 Rodden 2006; Wibbels 2005. 
24 National leaders may have control over legislator’s careers through appointments, the design of party 
lists or the allocation of campaign funds.     
25 Wealthy regions may also accept redistribution in exchange for increasing levels of political 
autonomy, as the example of Catalonia in Spain illustrates. 
26 Beramendi 2012; Manow 2005; León-Alfonso 2007. 
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We expect the geography of recipients to have no significant impact in the provision 
of social policies in proportional systems (A=C, ceteris paribus). As we stated above, 
the allocation of seats in proportional systems is fundamentally determined by vote 
share, so votes count the same regardless of their geographical location. An increase 
in the geographical targeting of social policies may undermine the effectiveness of 
social spending to win votes across many districts in the country. However, as there is 
no premium for geographically clustered votes, concentration does not offset the 
comparative advantage of social spending relative to distribute policies as a strategy 
to compete for votes under PR rules. Accordingly, we expect elected officials’ 
incentives to provide social policies in proportional systems not to be significantly 
affected by the degree of concentration of social recipients.  
Finally, we cannot make any prediction on whether the geography of recipients may 
offset the effect of electoral rules on public spending. The geographic concentration 
of social recipients may reduce differences in levels of social spending between 
electoral systems; but we cannot predict whether social spending in majoritarian 
systems will eventually offset levels of provision under PR. This means we cannot 
provide any hypothesis on whether D will be larger than C. This is ultimately an 
empirical question that we will address in our analysis.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Variables, data and methods 
We operationalise our dependent variable as social expenditure and social security 
transfers as a percentage of GDP in 22 OECD countries for the period 1980 – 2010 
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(OECD 2012)27.These are the two conventional variables used in the literature to 
measure the level of social policy provision in a country. Social expenditure captures 
all social spending, whereas social security transfers measures entitlement 
programmes, such as unemployment, sickness and disability benefits. 
Our argument is that when the demand for these policies is concentrated in certain 
regions28, elected officials under majoritarian rules will have more incentives to 
increase social spending. To measure the concentration of social policy recipients 
across regions, we use levels of regional unemployment. Unemployment rates are the 
most straightforward measure of cross-regional differences in income, levels of social 
need, or demand for social policies. Thus, we operationalise the geographic 
concentration of social policy recipients by measuring the geographic concentration 
of unemployment rates.  
To calculate the geographic concentration of recipients, we use three different 
measures. Our main measure is the Adjusted Geographic Concentration (AGC) index 
proposed by (Spiezia 2003) and developed from Ellison and Glaeser (1997). This 
index is used extensively by the OECD29. The AGC compares the unemployment size 
and the geographic weight over all regions in a given country and is constructed to 
																																								 																				
27 The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland (for the AGC and per90/10 models), Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland United Kingdom, and USA. 
28 This is also an increasing trend. Overman and Puga (2002) show that regions that had a low 
unemployment rate relative to the European average in 1986 tended to maintain or reduce their 
unemployment rate over the next decade, while regions that had a high unemployment rate relative to 
the European average in 1986 tended to have a higher unemployment rate in 1996.  
29 This index has also been used in academic research such as Rovolis and Tragaki (2006), Milner and 
Mukherjee (2010) or Gardiner, Martin and Tyler (2010), among others. 
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account for both within- and between country differences in the size of regions. AGC 
index lies between 0 (no concentration) and 1 (maximum concentration) and, it is 
suitable for international comparisons of geographic concentration.30 
The second measure is the coefficient of variation of regional unemployment rates 
(coefficient variation). This results from dividing the regional standard deviation of 
unemployment rates with the average unemployment rate at the regional level. Both 
the regional standard deviation and average unemployment rate have been calculated 
weighting each region by its size (measured as the active population in the region). As 
with the AGC, it also has the advantage of ranging from 0 to 1.  
The third measure is the ratio between the unemployment rate in the percentile 90 
region and the unemployment rate in the region in the percentile 10 (perc90/10). The 
rationale of this measure is that the larger the difference between unemployment rates 
in high and low-unemployment regions, the stronger the geographic concentration of 
unemployment and the more unequal is the demand for social policies across the 
territory of the country.  
The regional data for these indices are taken from the Eurostat Regional Statistics (for 
the European countries), and the OECD Regional Statistics (for the non-European 
countries). We use the NUTS 3 units for European countries, which is the most 
disaggregated unit we can use. For the non-European countries, the OECD Regional 
Statistics considers as regions: the States in US and Canada, the regions in Japan, and 
the States and Territories in Australia. 
																																								 																				
30 See more details in Spiezia (2003).  
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These indices capture relevant differences in the levels of concentration of social 
policy recipients. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the AGC and the coefficient of 
variation for all the countries in the sample31. It can be seen that Italy and Belgium 
tend to be the most geographically unequal countries, while the countries with lower 
regional differences are Australia and Netherlands. Although there is variation within-
countries, differences between countries are more prominent. Hence, our empirical 
strategy will be mostly focused to exploit between-country variation. A first 
descriptive glance to the data seems to support our main argument. Taking, for 
instance, the second half of the nineties, the three majoritarian countries with highest 
levels of geographic concentration were Italy, France, and the United Kingdom, 
which were also the three majoritarian countries with higher levels of social 
expenditure. The differences are particularly large with regards to France and Italy. 
While the average social expenditure in this period in the rest of the majoritarian 
countries in the sample is 16.57% of the GDP, this figure rises up to 29.7% in France 
and 24.35% in Italy. In addition, this seems to offset the differences between electoral 
systems. The provision of social expenditure, as measured by the OECD, in this 
period in Italy is above the average of the PR countries (23.6 %) and in France it was 
the highest in the sample, including all the PR systems.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The basic argument in the paper is that the geographic concentration of beneficiaries 
will moderate the effect of electoral rules upon levels of social provision. To test this 
hypothesis we interact the concentration indexes with two different variables that 
																																								 																				
31 The perc90/10 measure displays similar trends, but we do not plot here as it has a different scale. Its 
mean value is 2.16 and the standard deviation is 0.97. The correlation with the AGC and the coefficient 
of variation is 0.81 and 0.83 respectively. 
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operationalise electoral rules. The first one is the effective electoral threshold32, which 
measures the average share of votes that a party needs to win to secure parliamentary 
representation with a probability of at least 50 per cent. It ranges from 0.375 in single-
member district systems to 0 in proportional systems with one single national 
district33. Secondly, we use a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the 
electoral system is a majoritarian system (majoritarian), and 0 otherwise.34 We expect 
the interaction coefficient between the concentration indexes and electoral system 
variables to have a positive sign. In other words, the provision of social spending in 
majoritarian systems will be higher as the concentration of recipients increases.  
The statistical models include several economic and political controls. First, we 
include the unemployment rate. This variable captures the general demand for social 
spending in the country. The argument is that in countries with higher levels of 
unemployment, pressure to expand social spending is more prominent. With a similar 
logic, models also control for GDP growth. This is a very standard economic control 
that accounts for the effects of economic growth upon the need of social policies. 
When the country is growing, pressures on social spending will be lower. We also 
include two economic controls of the country’s degree of exposure to globalisation: 
trade openness and financial openness. The former is measured as the total trade (sum 
of imports and exports) as percentage of GDP. The latter is operationalised using 
Chinn and Ito’s (2008) financial openness index, which measures openness in capital 
																																								 																				
32 Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994. 
33 Average district magnitude is taken from Johnson and Wallack 2012 database.  
34 The countries coded as majoritarian in the sample are Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy (for 
the period 1993-2005), New Zealand (before its 1996 electoral system reform) Japan, United Kingdom, 
and United States.  
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account transactions in a 0 to 100 index. Two competing hypotheses on the impact of 
globalisation predict opposite effects upon the dependent variable. The compensation 
hypothesis states that openness is associated to higher levels of government spending 
and social protection.35 On the contrary, the globalization hypothesis predicts that 
international competition forces countries to decrease social spending.36 Models also 
control for the interest rate, which is a proxy of the costs associated to the expansion 
of social policy programs through debt. This control follows upon Altig and Davis’s 
work (1989), who show that financial restrictions constraint the distributive 
calculations of governments.  
As political controls, we include a left government variable, measured as the 
percentage of the cabinet posts that belong to social democratic or left parties37. The 
common understanding in the literature is that ideology matters to explain 
government spending.38 With this control, we are essentially looking at the effect of 
electoral systems net of any partisan-government bias that each system may exhibit- 
PR systems might be more pro-left; and majoritarian more pro-right.39 Voter turnout 
in the previous election is also included in the models. Assuming that lower income 
citizens are less prone to vote, parties will have more incentives to provide 
redistributive policies when turnout is higher.40  
																																								 																				
35 Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998. 
36 Tanzi 2000. 
37 This measure is also weighted by days of the year that each member of the cabinet holds the post. It 
is taken from Armingeon, et al. (2008). 
38 See, for instance, Huber and Stephens 2001; Bradley, et al. 2003; Rueda 2007. 
39 See Iversen and Soskice 2006. 
40 Nelson 1999; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005. 
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We test our hypothesis with data on 22 OECD countries for the years 1980-2010. 
Panels are unbalanced due to cross-country variation in data availability. Data cover 
almost 30 years for Canada, France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, while only includes 
nine observations for Switzerland, and four for Denmark. On average, each regression 
encompasses around 14 observations per country. We estimate time series panel 
corrected standard error estimations.41 As social spending has an increasing trend 
overtime, all models include a panel specific autoregressive error term. To account for 
the robustness of these estimations, we run further empirical checks in section 5. 
 
5. Results  
In this section we test our main hypothesis using the two dependent variables: social 
expenditure (table 2) and social security transfers (table 3). Before getting into the 
main results, the sign and significance of control variables deserve some discussion. 
Results show that, as expected, the unemployment rate has a positive impact on social 
spending, while GDP growth decreases the need for social policies, having a negative 
impact on general levels of social expenditure, and unemployment benefits in 
particular. Furthermore, the trade openness variable displays a positive and 
significant coefficient in most of the models, whereas the financial openness index, 
exhibits volatile and non-significant signs. In Rodrik’s (1998) terms, these results hint 
at globalisation having more of an effect on boosting demand for insurance (trade), 
while the evidence of making its funding more difficult (due to capital mobility) is 
less strong. In addition, we also find a consistent and expected negative effect of the 
interest rate, but only significant for the social expenditure models.  
																																								 																				
41 Beck and Katz 2004. 
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As for the political variables, we do not find partisan effects upon levels of social 
policies. This finding is in line with research claiming that the direct impact of the 
ideology of the government on spending policies is unclear, and its effect will be 
contingent on other contextual variables, both institutional and economic. This is 
noted in Pontusson et al. (2002) and Kwon and Pontusson (2010), among others42. In 
addition, we find evidence that a higher electoral turnout increases social expenditure, 
but only for general social spending. Pontusson and Rueda (2010) provide empirical 
evidence that when voter turnout is high, only left parties have more incentives to 
provide redistributive policies. This could explain why we do not find a positive 
effect of turnout upon social security transfers, as the effect might be contingent upon 
ideology of the ruling party.  
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The most important independent variables of the empirical analyses are the 
interactions between the three geographic concentration indexes and the two electoral 
system variables. First, tables 2 and 3 show that in all model specifications, 
majoritarian electoral rules, either measured as effective electoral threshold or as a 
majoritarian dummy variable, exhibit a negative effect on social expenditure and 
social security transfers when the concentration of recipients is zero. This finding 
provides support to our first prediction (A>B):  proportional electoral systems provide 
higher levels of social benefits than less proportional systems conditional on 
geographic concentration being zero.  
																																								 																				
42	We have also interacted partisanship with the concentration variables below and we do not find any 
effects conditional on concentration either. 	
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Second, results show that the provision of social policies in majoritarian systems 
increases as the territorial clustering of unemployment grows. This is indicated by the 
positive and highly significant interaction terms between electoral rules and 
concentration indices across the twelve model specifications of tables 2 and 3 and 
provides support to the main hypothesis of this paper (D>B in Table 1). This effect is 
very robust as it is displayed on both dependent variables –social expenditure and 
social security transfers- regardless of which concentration or electoral variables are 
used in the model. 
We also find a less robust negative effect of geographic concentration in PR systems- 
as indicated by the concentration variable principal component. In half of the models, 
the concentration variable has a significant negative impact by itself on social 
spending, which means that for non-majoritarian electoral systems (those with value 0 
in the electoral system variables), geographic concentration of beneficiaries reduces 
social spending. The finding is of low magnitude and not very robust (as it even 
exhibits a positive coefficient in model 2.2 and 2.5). In the theoretical section, our 
expectation was that PR rules would be neutral in relation with the concentration of 
social policy beneficiaries. However, if something, our results seem to point out that 
the concentration of social policy demand has a negative effect on social spending as 
proportionality increases. This negative effect of the concentration of interests in PR 
settings is in line with Rickard’s (2012) and Jusko’s (2010) findings and suggests that 
PR systems are relatively more generous in terms of social spending when social 
beneficiaries are dispersed than when they are geographically concentrated.43 
																																								 																				
43 Note that in the previous analyses our concentration variables (tables 2 and 3) also had a negative 
impact in PR systems, but the significance of the coefficients was not robust and the magnitude of that 
	 21	
Altogether, these findings suggest that the effect of electoral rules on the provision of 
a social policy is contingent upon the distribution of its recipients. Governments in 
proportional electoral systems provide more social policies when the beneficiaries are 
dispersed all over the country. However, as the geographic concentration of 
beneficiaries augments, governments in majoritarian electoral systems increase the 
provision of social policies compared to PR systems.  
As tables only exhibit conditional parameters and significance must be assessed for 
all values of independent variables, we follow Brambor et al.’s (2006) guidelines, and 
supply graphical results that allow us to better observe the sign and magnitude of the 
effects.  
Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of the electoral system on social expenditure 
conditional on the degree of concentration of unemployment (interaction coefficients 
of model 1.1). We can observe that the marginal effect of the electoral system varies 
across different levels of concentration. When clustering is low (left hand side of the 
graph), the marginal impact of majoritarian rules is to reduce social spending 
compared to PR systems, as predicted in the literature. However, as the demand for 
social spending becomes more geographically concentrated, the effect of the electoral 
system upon social spending changes. When the AGC index is 0.23 (slightly more 
than a standard deviation over the mean), more majoritarian electoral rules exhibit a 
positive effect on social spending. This effect gets stronger as concentration continues 
to increase. In other words, while PR gives elected officials more incentives to 
provide higher levels of social spending under low levels of recipient’s concentration, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
effect, as it can be seen in figure 3, was very little compared to the impact of geography on social 
provision under majoritarian rules. 
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when concentration is high, the incentives are higher under majoritarian electoral 
rules.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The figure accounts for the marginal effect of electoral systems under different levels 
of geographic concentration of unemployment. This moderating impact of 
concentration could potentially make the differences between electoral systems 
disappear or even overturn the prediction that proportional systems will provide 
higher aggregate levels of social policies. To have a better representation of the 
moderating effect of concentration across electoral systems, figure 3 simulates the 
impact of a majoritarian and a PR system on social spending under different 
concentration settings44. In a context with low concentration (AGC=0.05), social 
expenditure in PR systems is just over 23.5% of the GDP. This is, as expected, a 
higher level of social policies than a country with a majoritarian electoral system, 
where provision would be just below 20% of the GDP. However, as recipients’ 
concentration increases, there is also an increase in the provision of social policies in 
majoritarian countries, while social policy provision remains the same in PR systems. 
Conversely, in a country with high geographic concentration of unemployment 
(AGC=0.35) the provision of social policies increases substantially under majoritarian 
electoral institutions. As a result, social policy provision ends up being higher in 
majoritarian than in PR systems. A country with a majoritarian electoral system is 
expected to spend almost 24% of the GDP in social policies, while PR countries 
would provide just over 21.5 % of the GDP. 
																																								 																				
44 For this simulation, we use model 2.4 and compare the predicted social expenditure in country where 
the majoritarian variable has value 1 with a country where the majoritarian variable has value zero. 
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[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
These simulations illustrate that recipients’ territorial concentration changes 
substantially the impact of majoritarian electoral systems on social spending, while 
there is also a small effect of PR electoral rules in the opposite direction. The 
empirical analysis suggests that geographic clustering can bring the effect of 
majoritarian rules upon social spending to be similar to those of PR systems. 
Although the established expectation in the literature is that the provision of social 
policies will be higher in proportional electoral systems, this will most significantly 
happen when geographic clustering is low. In case beneficiaries cluster in certain 
territories, the incentives to provide social policies in majoritarian electoral systems 
are actually stronger and, for high levels of concentration, they can potentially 
overturn the differences between electoral systems in levels of social spending. 
In table 4, we explore further the relation between electoral rules and geographic 
concentration on social policies providing a more nuanced account of the type of 
social spending. We replicate previous models using AGC as our main concentration 
variable and the two electoral system variables on different versions of the dependent 
variable: one measures social expenditure in cash and the other measures social 
expenditure in kind45. Our theoretical argument is that, when in countries with 
majoritarian electoral systems the demand for social policies is concentrated in 
specific regions of the country, pro-social coalitions will be formed from those 
districts where recipients of social policies are pivotal. In these circumstances, an 
increase in social policies is a more efficient strategy to win elections than targeting 
																																								 																				
45 For more details, see the OECD’s interpretative guide available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStatDownloadFiles/OECDSOCX2007InterpretativeGuide_En.pdf 
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district by district with pork barrel. Hence, the interactions between concentration of 
beneficiaries and electoral rules should have an effect in levels of provision of in-cash 
benefits, but should not be relevant to account for the levels of social policies in kind.  
We can see that empirical models confirm this. The interaction effect that we detected 
in previous tables is mostly due to in-cash policies. While the interactions are strongly 
significant to explaining social expenditure in cash in models 4.1 and 4.2, the 
significance vanishes when the dependent variable is social policies in kind (models 
4.3 and 4.4). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
A second issue is whether our results are explained just by an increase in the 
provision of unemployment benefits as a response to unemployment concentration or 
whether the variation in social expenditure is explained by a wider range of social 
policies. In models 4.5 to 4.8 we break in-cash social spending into two categories: 
unemployment spending (formed by unemployment benefits and active labour market 
policies) and other social expenditure. As we said, we use unemployment 
concentration as a proxy of the concentration of social policy beneficiaries and as an 
indication of how concentrated general social policies demand is. Results of models 
4.5 through 4.8 show that our variable of concentration does not simply capture 
demand for unemployment benefits. Although the interaction between concentration 
of beneficiaries and electoral system has a positive and significant effect on the 
provision of unemployment policies, the effect is stronger when we use as a 
dependent variable the rest of in-cash- social expenditure (models 4.7 and 4.8). This 
means that our concentration variables are useful to capture not only the concentration 
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of the unemployed, but more generally the concentration of demand for social 
spending. 
	
6. Robustness checks 
Empirical findings in the previous section are quite straightforward. The geographic 
concentration of social policy beneficiaries increases the provision of social spending 
in majoritarian electoral systems. This conditional effect significantly reduces the 
differences between electoral systems in levels of social provision. 
In this section, we check the robustness qualities of the results in several ways. First, 
we use a different measure of the concentration of recipients. In table 5 we replicate 
the analysis using Selway’s measure of cross-cuttingness between income and 
geography (income-geography overlap). This measure is developed by Selway (2011) 
using survey data and it captures the extent to which the income cleavage overlaps 
with geography in each country. Income can be a good proxy of demand for social 
spending, and this is why we consider Selway’s measure to be a good alternative 
operationalisation of the geographic concentration of social policy demand. When the 
cross-cutting index scores low, it means that individuals with low and high incomes 
tend to live in different regions, whereas it scores high if incomes are distributed in a 
similar way across the territory, meaning that cleavages cross-cut each other. Note, 
however, that the interpretation of the interaction coefficient now is the opposite than 
in the previous analyses, as lower values of the cross-cuttingness measure imply 
higher levels of concentration. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 5 displays the results of the econometric model using Selway’s index to 
operationalise concentration of recipients. It can be observed that results are robust to 
the use of a time-invariant measure such as income-geography overlap. The 
interaction between this variable and type of electoral system is significant across all 
model specifications. This implies that when income and geography correlate (in 
other words, income is concentrated in certain regions), majoritarian electoral systems 
increase the provision of social policies compared to PR ones. These results are 
similar to the ones reported in the previous section with our time-varying 
concentration variables. Interestingly, the empirical test now exhibits a stronger effect 
with respect to the relationship between geographic concentration and social spending 
in PR countries: the greater the overlapping between income and region the lower the 
levels of social provision under PR rules. Altogether these results confirm those in the 
previous sections and highlight the importance of the geography of income to mediate 
the effect of electoral rules on social spending. 
In table 6 we run further empirical checks to test whether results are robust to 
different model specifications. We carry out the empirical analyses using social 
expenditure as dependent variable and the AGC as the concentration variable, but 
results are quite similar using the social security transfers, or the in-cash social 
expenditure as dependent variable, or other concentration variables, as independent 
variable. 
We first check that empirical findings are not driven by one or two individual cases, 
as countries with high levels of regional concentration, such as Italy, or Belgium, are 
PR countries. In models 6.1 and 6.2 we replicate the analyses of table 2 using jack-
knife tests. In addition, as Italy tends to be the country with higher values in the 
concentration variables, in models 6.3 and 6.4 we perform the analyses dropping all 
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the Italian observations. As it can be seen, the interaction between AGC and the two 
electoral system variables holds with similar magnitude and significance levels across 
all these models. 
 [TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
We also want to rule out the possibility that the electoral system is endogenous to the 
concentration of social policy recipients. The argument would be that countries where 
there is a higher concentration of social policy recipients, and, in turn, more 
fragmentation of interests, are more likely to have a majoritarian electoral system46. 
This possibility is partially ruled out when we look to the correlation between the 
AGC and the effective electoral threshold (-0.19). The correlation is very low and it 
has the opposite sign to the expected if there was an endogeneity problem. In any case, 
we follow Rickard (2012) and run a two-stage least square model (2SLS) using as an 
instrument the year in which the current electoral system was set47. There is plenty of 
evidence showing that the age of the electoral system correlates with the type of 
electoral system, as countries with older electoral laws tend to have more majoritarian 
electoral rules. This is a useful instrument because the type of electoral system will be 
explained by the year of its adoption, while it is unlikely that this year is related to the 
level of the geographic concentration of social policy recipients today. Models 6.5 
and 6.6 display the results of the 2SLS models. The interactions are significant and 
																																								 																				
46 A similar argument with regards to federalism has been put forward by Beramendi (2007). He shows 
that in those countries where income is concentrated in certain regions, it is more likely that federal 
institutions arise. 
47 Others that use the electoral system birth year as an instrument are Persson and Tabellini (2003), 
Evans (2009) or Fumagalli and Narciso (2012), among others. We take this variable from Persson and 
Tabellini’s database (2003). 
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the magnitude of the coefficients is quite similar, which confirms the robustness of 
the empirical findings. 
All our models have include a panel-specific autoregressive error term. To deal with 
non-stationarity, we also run models with a lagged dependent variable, both with the 
dependent variable specified as level or as a first-difference. Models 6.7 to 6.10 
display the results. Although the lagged dependent variable subtracts, as expected, 
part of the magnitude of the effects48, the interactions remain significant in the four 
specifications. 
Finally, we replicate empirical analyses with fixed-effects. We have previously shown 
that most of the variation of our concentration variables is between countries, rather 
than within countries. Still, models 6.11 and 6.12 include these analyses for the sake 
of robustness. Our majoritarian variable displays temporal trends with no variation 
for almost all countries, which could potentially lead to unreliable point estimates and 
biased estimators if fixed effects are used. Therefore, in this case we use Plümper and 
Troeger’s (2007) fixed effects vector decomposition method to separate the country 
fixed-effects from the effect of the rest of the variables. As it can be seen in models 
6.11 and 6.12, the introduction of fixed effects does not modify the sign and 
magnitude of the effect of the social expenditure model. In addition, the interactions 
are significant at conventional levels in both models. This implies that although our 
theoretical argument is mostly explaining between-country variation, it can also be 
applied to account for within-country variation49. 
 
																																								 																				
48 Keele and Kelly 2006; Achen 2000. 
49 We also find these results if we run the analyses with a standard fixed-effects model. 
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7. Concluding remarks and further research 
The literature that explores the relationship between social policies and electoral 
institutions has largely overlooked the role of social recipients’ geographic 
concentration in explaining levels of welfare provision. In this paper we purport to fill 
this literature gap by analysing how the geographic distribution of social recipients 
moderates the impact of electoral rules upon social spending. The paper provides 
robust empirical findings showing that the territorial distribution of social 
beneficiaries is important to account for variation in levels of social provision across 
OECD countries. We have found that in majoritarian electoral systems, the higher the 
concentration of social recipients, the higher the provision of social policies. When 
demand for social policies clusters in certain regions, elected officials under 
majoritarian rules increase the provision of social spending. For high levels of 
concentration, social provision may in turn be higher in majoritarian systems than in 
PR countries, which contradicts the standard predictions in the literature.  
Our findings raise additional theoretical and empirical questions that could be 
addressed in future research studies. First, the paper convincingly shows that the 
unemployment rate can be interpreted as a general measure of social need, but there 
may be others. In particular the elderly, which have a strong impact on social transfer 
spending (through pensions and health care). Being a populated group, we may expect 
them to become "pivotal" voters and significantly affect policy-makers’ behaviour. 
An empirical question is whether the hypothesis of the paper holds when we analyse 
the geographical concentration of those approaching old age. 
Second, although we presumed that the geographic concentration of interests would 
not affect social provision under proportional rules, some of the analyses carried 
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showed a lower, but significant negative impact of concentration of recipients upon 
social spending in PR countries. This empirical result is in line with previous studies 
on industrial policies such as Rickard (2012) and suggests that a better understanding 
of the joint impact of electoral rules and the geography of recipients upon social 
spending in PR systems is needed. For instance, a potential avenue for research could 
consist in exploring whether the existence of powerful regional leaders weakens the 
impact of concentration upon levels of social provision.  Regional entrepreneurs in 
decentralised contexts may successfully resist any attempt by national officials to 
reduce social spending. In this context we may expect levels of social provision to be 
less dependent on changes in the geographic concentration of social recipients. More 
generally, decentralised institutions may also help to provide a better account of 
distributive spending across PR systems. Powerful regional actors in proportional 
systems may succeed in targeting public goods towards their jurisdictions, so we may 
expect higher levels of targeted spending in proportional decentralized systems than 
in unitary ones. 
A third important question that deserves further study is the degree of elasticity of 
social spending to geography. If we assume that citizens reward increases in public 
spending and penalise reductions in social provision, then variation in the level of 
concentration of recipients will have a relatively bigger effect in rising social 
spending than in reducing universalistic expenditures. Put it differently, the marginal 
increase in social spending that may result from higher levels of concentration will be 
relatively bigger than the marginal reduction in social provision associated to a more 
dispersed distribution of recipients across territories. This may result in a path-
dependent spending pattern whereby high levels of social spending in the past reduce 
the effect of geography on social provision in the future. An empirical analysis along 
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these theoretical lines would in any case require longer time-series data to allow a 
detailed tracking of within-country variation over time.  
Further developments of the theoretical insights of the paper would also require a 
better account of the individual-level mechanisms that underlie the hypotheses. One 
of the key assumptions in the analysis is that the concentration of social recipients 
increases demand for social spending. However, survey-based empirical evidence is 
needed showing if regional context shapes individuals’ political preferences upon 
social provision50; and whether changes in preferences in turn affect the decision to 
vote.51 Our results suggest that electoral concerns are important for public officials 
when deciding about levels of social provision. Yet further research analyses should 
explore whether politicians’ strategies actually map onto citizens’ preferences and 
vote.  
Finally, future research in the area should provide closer attention to the self-
reinforcing dynamics in social spending. The geographical concentration of 
beneficiaries may actually promote party development by bonding the interests of the 
represented (social recipients) and their representatives. Stronger organisational 
capacities may in turn contribute to strengthen the bargaining power of the pro-social 
coalition within and across political parties. Also, if the concentration of social 
beneficiaries is associated to increasing electoral payoffs, politicians may have 
incentives to uphold and even exacerbate regional concentration of beneficiaries in 
certain areas. Further exploration of these dynamics will contribute to provide a more 
nuanced account of the argument robust to potential endogenous relationships. 
																																								 																				
50 Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Cutler 2007. 
51 Burbank 1997. 
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Table 1. Level of provision of social policies according to the electoral system and the geography 
of recipients 
 Proportional Majoritarian 
Non-concentrated recipients of 
social policies 
 A B 
Geographically concentrated 
recipients 
C D 
Predictions (A>B) 
(D>B) 
(A=C) 
(D>C?) 
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Table 2: Recipients’ Geographic Concentration, Electoral System and Social 
Expenditure 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with Panel-Corrected Standard-Errors 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) 
VARIABLES Social Exp. 
(%GDP) 
Social Exp. 
(%GDP) 
Social Exp. 
(%GDP) 
Social Exp. 
(%GDP) 
Social Exp. 
(%GDP) 
Social Exp. 
(%GDP)        
Unemployment rate 0.404*** 0.332*** 0.347*** 0.384*** 0.303*** 0.320*** 
 (0.0567) (0.0510) (0.0522) (0.0671) (0.0603) (0.0606) 
GDP growth -0.251*** -0.276*** -0.263*** -0.310*** -0.341*** -0.323*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0437) (0.0433) (0.0465) (0.0489) (0.0472) 
Trade openness 0.0405*** 0.0221*** 0.0358*** 0.0313*** 0.0271*** 0.0311*** 
 (0.00621) (0.00810) (0.00936) (0.00585) (0.00704) (0.00722) 
Financial openness -0.249 0.242 0.538* -0.116 -0.0438 0.187 
 (0.349) (0.248) (0.306) (0.359) (0.261) (0.301) 
Interest rate -0.322*** -0.270*** -0.229*** -0.414*** -0.307*** -0.274*** 
 (0.0691) (0.0637) (0.0629) (0.0787) (0.0709) (0.0696) 
Left government 0.000396 0.00163 0.00338 0.00416 0.00256 0.00257 
 (0.00258) (0.00268) (0.00287) (0.00297) (0.00298) (0.00324) 
Voter turnout 0.0215** 0.0409*** 0.0256** 0.0142 0.0319*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0119) (0.0105) (0.00979) (0.0102) 
Eff. el. threshold -0.199*** -0.172*** -0.178***    
 (0.0283) (0.0286) (0.0346)    
Majoritarian    -5.276*** -4.616*** -4.476*** 
    (0.863) (0.855) (0.867) 
AGC -17.08***   -6.411**   
 (3.474)   (2.654)   
Coeff. Variation  0.594   2.304*  
  (1.626)   (1.315)  
Perc 90/10   -0.798***   0.0596 
   (0.262)   (0.203) 
Eff. el. threshold*AGC 0.853***      
 (0.199)      
Eff. el. threshold*Coeff 
Var 
 0.146*     
  (0.0777)     
Eff. el. 
threshold*Perc90/10 
  0.0339***    
   (0.0125)    
Majoritarian*AGC    19.76***   
    (4.827)   
Majoritarian*Coeff Var     4.859***  
     (1.713)  
Majoritarian*Perc90/10      0.554** 
      (0.240) 
       
Observations 300 332 338 300 332 338 
R-squared 0.950 0.942 0.929 0.973 0.969 0.965 
All models contain a panel-specific AR(1) term. Constant not shown.  
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Recipients’ Geographic Concentration, Electoral System and Social Security 
Transfers 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with Panel-Corrected Standard-Errors 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) 
VARIABLES Social Sec. 
Transfers 
(%GDP) 
Social Sec. 
Transfers 
(%GDP) 
Social Sec. 
Transfers 
(%GDP) 
Social Sec. 
Transfers 
(%GDP) 
Social Sec. 
Transfers 
(%GDP) 
Social Sec. 
Transfers 
(%GDP) 
       
Unemployment rate 0.400*** 0.386*** 0.370*** 0.459*** 0.423*** 0.392*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0353) (0.0343) (0.0387) (0.0379) (0.0361) 
GDP growth -0.0857*** -0.102*** -0.0988*** -0.120*** -0.133*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0223) (0.0210) (0.0225) (0.0232) (0.0230) 
Trade openness 0.00438 0.00573 0.0118** 0.0141** 0.0132*** 0.00809** 
 (0.00594) (0.00476) (0.00512) (0.00609) (0.00452) (0.00324) 
Financial openness 0.131 -0.142 0.0367 0.203 0.207 0.188 
 (0.283) (0.214) (0.209) (0.260) (0.205) (0.203) 
Interest rate -0.0767* -0.0633 -0.0519 -0.0916** -0.0582 -0.0520 
 (0.0426) (0.0411) (0.0383) (0.0428) (0.0395) (0.0381) 
Left government 0.000894 0.000904 0.00178 -0.00339 -0.00296 -0.00232 
 (0.00182) (0.00194) (0.00201) (0.00220) (0.00224) (0.00235) 
Voter turnout 0.0114 0.0171** 0.00904 0.00369 0.00456 0.00915 
 (0.00726) (0.00808) (0.00806) (0.00907) (0.00961) (0.00961) 
Eff. el. threshold -0.0685*** -0.0756*** -0.0861***    
 (0.0160) (0.0213) (0.0218)    
Majoritarian    -3.505*** -3.586*** -3.896*** 
    (0.528) (0.525) (0.518) 
AGC -6.174***   0.340   
 (1.768)   (1.692)   
Coeff. Variation  -0.891   0.550  
  (1.187)   (0.912)  
Perc 90/10   -0.641***   -0.296** 
   (0.165)   (0.150) 
Eff. el. threshold*AGC 0.285***      
 (0.0805)      
Eff. el. threshold*Coeff 
Var 
 0.117*     
  (0.0614)     
Eff. el. 
threshold*Perc90/10 
  0.0215***    
   (0.00737)    
Majoritarian*AGC    9.932***   
    (2.310)   
Majoritarian*Coeff Var     3.842***  
     (1.065)  
Majoritarian*Perc90/10      0.469*** 
      (0.133) 
       
Observations 334 361 365 334 361 365 
R-squared 0.916 0.889 0.922 0.974 0.972 0.971 
All models contain a panel-specific AR(1) term. Constant not shown.  
Panel  corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4: Robustness checks on the dependent variables. Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with Panel-Corrected Standard-Errors 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) 
VARIABLES Social 
Expenditure in 
Cash 
Social 
Expenditure in 
Cash  
Social 
Expenditure in 
Kind 
Social 
Expenditure in 
Kind 
Unemploym. 
Policies 
Unemploym. 
Policies  
Other social 
Expenditure 
Other social 
Expenditure 
         
Unemployment rate 0.370*** 0.408*** 0.0357 0.0328 0.198*** 0.207*** 0.183*** 0.202*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0377) (0.0266) (0.0260) (0.0126) (0.0139) (0.0239) (0.0322) 
GDP growth -0.125*** -0.137*** -0.0886*** -0.0888*** -0.0204** -0.0217** -0.104*** -0.130*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0187) (0.0183) (0.00818) (0.00868) (0.0150) (0.0188) 
Trade openness 0.0213*** 0.00781* 0.00429 0.00414 0.00855*** 0.0108*** 0.0105** -0.0120*** 
 (0.00675) (0.00413) (0.00308) (0.00282) (0.00264) (0.00315) (0.00412) (0.00269) 
Financial openness 0.0602 0.232 -0.267 -0.276* 0.118 0.0816 -0.0528 0.168 
 (0.234) (0.267) (0.169) (0.167) (0.0734) (0.0697) (0.223) (0.222) 
Interest rate -0.0755* -0.0106 -0.135*** -0.137*** 0.0205 0.0236 -0.0334 -0.0514 
 (0.0426) (0.0443) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0358) (0.0411) 
Left government -3.77e-05 -0.000232 -0.00258** -0.00266** 0.000724 0.000123 -0.000746 -0.000470 
 (0.00189) (0.00205) (0.00121) (0.00125) (0.000604) (0.000629) (0.00166) (0.00191) 
Voter turnout -0.00885 -0.00402 0.00533 0.00824 0.00321 0.00306 -0.0208*** -0.00438 
 (0.00703) (0.00814) (0.00499) (0.00516) (0.00224) (0.00248) (0.00684) (0.00701) 
AGC -9.467*** -2.272 -2.915 -1.967 -3.435*** -2.586*** -6.627*** 2.344 
 (2.847) (2.615) (1.869) (1.441) (0.702) (0.567) (2.200) (2.072) 
Effective El. Threshold -0.135***  -0.00760  -0.0276***  -0.0895***  
 (0.0201)  (0.0109)  (0.00579)  (0.0178)  
Eff Elec. Thr.*AGC 0.426***  0.0196  0.131***  0.283***  
 (0.118)  (0.0807)  (0.0396)  (0.104)  
Majoritarian  -3.223***  -0.290  -0.469***  -2.904*** 
  (0.597)  (0.210)  (0.179)  (0.474) 
Majoritarian*AGC  8.994***  0.437  1.948**  7.352*** 
  (2.732)  (1.268)  (0.850)  (2.642) 
         
Observations 300 300 300 300 289 289 289 289 
R-squared 0.925 0.962 0.884 0.901 0.794 0.853 0.935 0.965 
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
All models contain a panel-specific AR(1) term. Constant not shown. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Robustness Checks on the concentration variable (IGC) 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with Panel-Corrected Standard-Errors 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) 
VARIABLES Social Exp. 
(%GDP) 
Social Exp. 
(%GDP) 
Social Sec. 
Transfers (%GDP) 
Social Sec. 
Transfers (%GDP) 
     
Unemployment rate 0.311*** 0.333*** 0.370*** 0.385*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0367) (0.0279) (0.0277) 
GDP growth -0.186*** -0.195*** -0.0780*** -0.0727*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0248) (0.0136) (0.0131) 
Trade openness -0.000503 -0.0234*** 0.000216 -0.0156*** 
 (0.00679) (0.00495) (0.00408) (0.00456) 
Financial openness 0.288** 0.391*** 0.0332 0.209** 
 (0.141) (0.130) (0.0820) (0.0852) 
Interest rate -0.201*** -0.188*** -0.0253 -0.0205 
 (0.0390) (0.0383) (0.0252) (0.0254) 
Left government 0.000324 0.000508 -0.000702 -0.000627 
 (0.00182) (0.00177) (0.00133) (0.00126) 
Voter turnout 0.0194* 0.0294*** 0.0207*** 0.0122* 
 (0.0109) (0.00984) (0.00697) (0.00658) 
Effective El. Threshold 3.707***  0.467*  
 (0.367)  (0.253)  
Majoritarian  131.2***  58.47*** 
  (9.108)  (10.57) 
Income Geography 
Cross-Cuttingnesss 
(IGC) 
99.85*** 106.3*** 19.04** 40.59*** 
 (12.52) (8.923) (7.755) (8.586) 
Eff El. Th*IGC -4.445***  -0.567*  
 (0.436)  (0.291)  
Majoritarian*IGC  -158.6***  -70.75*** 
  (10.89)  (12.67) 
     
Observations 607 607 819 827 
R-squared 0.934 0.934 0.835 0.839 
All models contain a panel-specific AR(1) term. Constant not shown.  
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Robustness checks on model specification 
 Dependent variable: Social Expenditure (%GDP) 
 Jack-knife PCSE (AR1) 
models 
PCSE (AR1)  without 
Italty  
2SLS models 
VARIABLES (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) 
       
AGC -17.08** -6.411 -18.55*** -11.26*** -8.934* -7.125** 
 (8.539) (6.682) (3.520) (2.257) (5.161) (3.040) 
Eff. El. threshold -0.199  -0.189***  -0.209***  
 (0.122)  (0.0283)  (0.041)  
Eff. El. 
Threshold*AGC 
0.853**  0.861***  0.905***  
 (0.393)  (0.213)  (0.376)  
Majoritarian  -5.276***  -4.829***  -7.836*** 
  (1.739)  (0.854)  (0.873) 
Majoritarian*AGC  19.76***  20.37***  30.42*** 
  (7.008)  (6.342)  (6.900) 
       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 300 300 289 289 258 258 
R-squared 0.949 0.973 0.948 0.974 0.408 0.516 
 PCSE with Lagged DV 
(AR1) 
PCSE with First 
Differenced and Lagged 
DV 
Fixed Effects (AR1) 
VARIABLES (6.7) (6.8) (6.9) (6.10) (6.11) (6.12) 
       
AGC -2.209* -1.189 -1.941** -1.222* -11.628*** -9.519 
 (1.174) (0.856) (0.993) (0.678) (3.478) (7.596) 
Eff. El. threshold -0.0171**  -0.0134**  -0.0372  
 (0.0074)  (0.0062)  (0.0253)  
Eff. El. 
Threshold*AGC 
0.122**  0.098**  0.334**  
 (0.056)  (0.049)  (0.160)  
Majoritarian  -0.429**  -0.297*  -9.028*** 
  (0.190)  (0.154)  (2.097) 
Majoritarian*AGC  2.023*  1.728*  38.185** 
  (1.102)  (0.966)  (16.781) 
       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 299 299 299 299 278 278 
R-squared 0.989 0.989 0.626 0.625 - - 
Constant and controls not shown. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 
	
